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ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to discuss evidence of short run stock 
overreaction with respect to the arrival of dramatic events in the 
Malaysian stock market. The findings reveal that Malaysian stock 
market overreacts to economic crisis and extraordinary political 
events. The study shows significant overreaction behaviour existed in 
this market upon announcement of the removal of the deputy prime 
minister and announcement of the resignation of the prime minister. In 
contrast, evidence of underreaction was detected upon announcement 
of the national election. With regards to dramatic international events, 
Malaysian stock markets only disclose evidence of stock overreaction 
behaviour to SARS outbreak. 
Keywords: Stock overreaction, EMH, Bursa Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
Fama (1970) defines stock market as efficient if stock prices fully reflect all available 
information.  This definition implies that the available information cannot be used 
to forecast stock prices in a fully efficient market.  It is due to the reason that the 
current market price of a stock is the best estimates of its value and therefore should 
reflect all available relevant information.  The price of a stock as well, is expected to 
change immediately and unbiasedly upon the arrival of new information.  However, 
many published works (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1987; Fung, 1999; Gaunt, 
2000; Lai, et al., 2003 and Iihara et al., 2004) found evidence suggesting that over 
the long run, some predictability may exist in stock returns.  These long term and 
* Corresponding author: Email: norliali71@gmail.com
Any remaining errors or omissions rest solely with the author(s) of this paper.
320
International Journal of Economics and Management
short term behaviour in returns is often characterized as evidence of overreaction 
and under reaction by market participants.  Majority of studies in these areas have 
been performed in the US and UK’s market.  Until recently, there are a few studies 
related to these issues are documented for the Malaysian stock market (Lai, et al, 
2003; Ahmad and Hussain, 2001and Hameed and Ting (2000).  The objective of this 
paper is to investigate evidence of stock overreaction upon arrival of extraordinary 
events in the Malaysian stock market.
This paper is divided into six sections.  Section two will briefly discuss the 
idea of stock overreaction and its implications to EMH while section three talks 
about stock overreaction behaviour and the arrival of dramatic events.  Section 
four and five elaborate the methodology and findings of this study respectively. 
Section six summarizes the study.
STOCK OVERREACTION AND IMPLICATIONS TO EMH
Overreaction is a notion which suggests that, like human behaviour, stock price 
also has a tendency to overreact to extremely good and bad news.  This behaviour 
is generally resulting from market participants who overreact to the arrival of the 
new dramatic event but correct their behaviour later.  Such market overreaction 
behaviour proposes that stocks that perform best (worst) over an initial period tend 
to perform worst (best) in the subsequent period.  One strategy that is synonym 
with stock overreaction is the Contrarian Strategy.  The contrarians assume that 
market overreacts to events in such a way that extremely negative news pulls the 
stock very much below its true value and extraordinary positive news push the 
stock’s price well above its fair value.  This is due to the reason that investors 
tend to overreact to extreme information that it generate such price movements 
that go beyond the new justified equilibrium level.  Later, as investors realize that 
they have unduly reacted to the information and take corrective action, price will 
change to the opposite direction of the initial movements and approached its true 
equilibrium level.  This phenomenon suggests that there is some predictability 
exists in stock market where loser (winner) firms in one period are likely to win 
(lose) in the subsequent period.  So, strategy that based on Overreaction Hypothesis 
such as contrarian strategy of buying loser firms and selling winner firms is able 
to consistently earned potential abnormal returns.  Consistent abnormal profits 
earned by such strategies appear inconsistent with market efficiency, in which, 
it violates the weak form market efficiency.  EMH argues that current prices 
formed in a competitive and well-regulated market place reflect all known relevant 
information.  According to Ariff, Shamsher and Annuar (1998), it is not possible 
to make consistent predictions about how future prices will move based on past 
price patterns.  It is because, price changes are not due to stock overreaction and 
underreaction, but are due to new information, which includes new interpretation 
of existing information, given more recent developments.  Therefore, knowing 
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historical price data will not enable investors to consistently earned abnormal 
returns.  However, as mentioned above, many studies have documented the existence 
of stock overreaction behavior in various stock markets. 
If stock overreaction exist in Bursa Malaysia, then it would be possible to 
predict future prices based upon past price information to earn excess profit. 
This also means that stock prices on Bursa Malaysia will not be in its weak form 
efficiency if the evidence supports the overreaction or underreaction hypothesis.
STOCK OVERREACTION AND THE ARRIVAL OF  
NEW INFORMATION
In an efficient market, stock price is expected to adjust rapidly and accurately 
to its new equilibrium level upon arrival of new information.  Besides financial 
information, news about political, economic and social events will also be reflected 
in the stock prices.  It is worth to note that the efficiency of the stock market depends 
on how investors deduce and react towards such events.  If investors overreact 
towards such information, stock price will overshoots its target equilibrium level, 
and is expected to revert to its true equilibrium level in the subsequent period. 
There are a number of studies has been conducted such as Zhu (2007), Ising et. al 
(2006) and Michayluk and Neuhauser (2006) among others to test if stock price 
has overreacted towards arrival of new information.  Most of these studies have 
focused on stock market returns following extraordinary price movements (either 
large price increase or large price declines).  There is no study thus far that directly 
focused on stock overreaction behaviour upon arrival of specific events.  However, 
one stream of research related to stock market reaction, although it is not directly 
related to stock overreaction hypothesis (such as Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper, 
2002; Bialkwoski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski, 2008; Maloney and Mulherin, 2003 
among others) concentrates on extreme and dramatic events.  Such extreme and 
dramatic events include stock market crashes, political events, and catastrophic 
events like earthquakes, terrorist attacks, war and many more.  Their studies mostly 
ponder around price discovery, valuation and volatility of stock prices.  Findings 
from their studies show significant impact of extreme events on market reaction. 
Bursa Malaysia, being an emerging market will be affected by price over and 
underreaction in response to such events.  Such unexpected events can create 
stress in the stock market and consequently, may cause market participants to lose 
their ability to rationally assess the valuation implication of the events, which may 
results in stock overreaction and underreaction behaviour.  In Malaysia, Jothee 
and Annuar (2007) however have performed a study to measure the speed of price 
adjustment to corporate announcements while Otchere and Chan (2003) look into 
the stock overreaction behaviour in Hong Kong stock market around the period 
of 1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  Jothee and Annuar (2007) confirm that there is 
evidence of price overreaction to new information in Bursa Malaysia. 
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This current study divides extreme events into three categories namely domestic 
events, international events and economic events.  Domestic events will comprise of 
general elections, resignation of the Malaysian Prime Minister and removal of the 
deputy prime minister of Malaysia.  Gulf Crisis, Invasion of Iraq, Sept 11th terrorist 
attacks on US, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) and Asian Tsunami 
are group into international events while 1987 Financial Market Crisis and Asian 
Financial Crisis into economic events.  The reason why this study uses political 
events to represent domestic events is because in Malaysia, political involvement 
is very strong such that business and politics are interrelated.  According to Chen 
(2005), about 20% of market capitalization in Malaysia comprised of politically-
linked firms.  Therefore, surprise in political news may have an impact on investors’ 
overreaction behaviour.  Moreover, study by Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper (2002) 
prove that political risk may be able to explain some of the variation in emerging 
market returns.  If political risk is important in explaining returns variation in 
emerging market, then it may have influence on investors’ overreaction behaviour. 
In another study, Bialkowski, Gottschalk and Wisniewski (2008) find evidence that 
investors are surprised by the election outcome, thus suggesting that general election 
may be able to explain overreaction behaviour of the stock market.
Economic events such as market crash and crisis are also considered as 
important factor in the study of stock overreaction hypothesis.  Previous studies 
like Michayluk and Neuhauser (2006) and Otchere and Chan (2003) have found 
that stock market tend to overreact in times of crisis.  Besides economic events 
like market crash and crisis, security prices are also reacting to catastrophic events. 
Studies on stock price reaction to disaster have been conducted by Maloney and 
Mulherin (2003), and Shelor, Anderson and Cross (1990) among others.  Their 
findings suggest that security prices has significantly reacts to such events.  If 
catastrophic events have an impact on stock reaction, price discovery and valuation 
as presented by the above researches, it may have an influence on the behaviour of 
stock market in the context of stock overreaction hypothesis.  For the purpose of 
this study, dramatic events namely Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
Asian Tsunami, Sept 11th terrorist attack, Gulf Crisis, Invasion of Iraq on Kuwait 
have been chosen to represent international events as these events occurs at the 
international level.  This study investigates investors’ overreaction behaviour to 
catastrophic events namely SARS outbreak and Asian Tsunami because these 
two devastating events had greatly affected the economy of the affected area and 
thus might as well affect the behaviour of their respective investors.  Meanwhile, 
invasion of Iraq and the Gulf crisis involves oil producing country and therefore 
will have an effect on oil prices.  It is well known that oil prices play an important 
role in stock pricing and thus might influence investor’s behaviour.  Findings from 
this study will have an important implication for the strategies of institutional and 
individual investors. 
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METHODOLOGY
Table 1 summarizes list of events that occurred over the period of this study over 
the period between January 1987 and December 2006.
Table 1 List of events between January 1987 and December 2006
Events Date  
Domestic
Announcement of the 8th general election 4 October 1990
Announcement of the 9th general election 6 April 1995
Announcement of the 10th general election 10 November 1999
Announcement of the 11th general election 4 March 2004
Announcement on the removal of the then Deputy Prime Minister 2 September 1998
Announcement on the resignation of the then Prime Minister 22 June 2002
International
The Gulf crisis 3 August 1990
The September 11th 11 September 2001
SARS Outbreak 14 March 2003
Invasion of Iraq 21 March 2003
2004 Asian Tsunami 26 December 2004
Economics
1987 Crash 16 October 1987
Asian Financial Crisis 4 July 1997
Sources: Sazali (2004), Bernama Online and major newspaper.
Daily stock return is calculated as:
Rit = (ln Pt – ln Pt-1) * 100
Where () is the stock return in day t and is computed as the difference in 
natural logarithmic between today’s and yesterday’s closing price (P) obtained 
from Datastreams.  The formation period is defined as the current sub-period itself, 
whereas the test period is defined as the next sub-period that comes right after the 
current sub-period.  The 20-year period of the study provides twenty seven formation 
periods and its matching test periods as summarized in Table 2. 
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Table 2 Formation period and subsequent test period for each sub-period
Events Formation period Test period
Pre 1987 crash
During 1987 crash
Post 1987 crash
2 Jan 1987-15 Oct 1987
16 Oct 1987 – 31 Dec 1987
1 Jan 1988 – 2 Aug 1990
16 Oct 1987 – 31 Dec 1987
1 Jan 1988 – 2 Aug 1990
3 Aug 1990 – 3 Oct 1990
During Gulf Crisis 3 Aug 1990 – 3 Oct 1990 4 Oct 1990 – 21 Oct 1990
During 8th general election (GE)
Post 8th GE
4 Oct 1990 – 21 Oct 1990
22 Oct 1990 – 15 Nov 1990
22 Oct 1990 – 15 Nov 1990
16 Nov 1990 – 5 Apr 1995
Pre 9th GE
During 9th GE
Post 9th GE
16 Nov 1990 – 5 April 1995
6 Apr 1995 – 25 Apr 1995
26 Apr 1995 – 23 May 1995
6 Apr 1995 – 25 Apr 1995
26 Apr 1995 – 23 May 1995
24 May 1995 – 3 July 1997
Pre Asian Financial Crisis
During Asian Financial Crisis
24 May 1995 – 3 July 1997
4 July 1997 – 1 Sept 1998
4 July 1997 – 1 Sept 1998
2 Sept 1998 – 8 Jan 1999
During Removal of the DPM
Post removal of the DPM
2 Sept 1998 – 8 Jan 1999
9 Jan 1999 – 9 Nov 1999
9 Jan 1999 – 9 Nov 1999
10 Nov 1999 – 20 Nov 1999
During 10th GE
Post 10th GE
10 Nov 1999 – 20 Nov 1999
21 Nov 1999 – 30 Dec 1999
21 Nov 1999 – 30 Dec 1999
31 Dec 1999 – 10 Sept 2001
Pre September 11th
During September 11th
Post September 11th
31 Dec 1999 – 10 Sept 2001
11 Sept 2001 – 28 Dec 2001
29 Dec 2001 – 21 June 2002
11 Sept 2001 – 28 Dec 2001
29 Dec 2001 – 21 June 2002
22 June 2002 – 13 March 2003
During Resignation of the PM 22 June 2002 – 13 March 2003 14 March 2003 – 20 March 2003
During SARS Outbreak* 14 March 2003 – 20 March 2003 21 March 2003 – 15 Apr 2003
During Invasion of Iraq
Post Invasion of Iraq
21 March 2003 – 15 Apr 2003
16 Apr 2003 – 3 March 2004
16 Apr 2003 – 3 March 2004
4 March 2004 – 21 March 2004
During 11th GE 
Post 11th GE
4 March 2004 – 21 March 2004
22 March 2004 – 14 Apr 2004
22 March 2004 – 14 Apr 2004
15 Apr 2004 – 24 Dec 2004
Pre Asian Tsunami
During Asian Tsunami
Post Asian Tsunami
15 Apr 2004 – 24 Dec 2004
26 Dec 2004 – 9 Jan 2005
10 Jan 2005 – 31 Dec 2005
26 Dec 2004 – 9 Jan 2005
10 Jan 2005 – 31 Dec 2005
1 Jan 2006 – 31 Dec 2006
For pre-1987 crisis, the study firstly identifies all firms in Bursa Malaysia with 
a complete set of returns from 2 January 1987 to 15 October 1987.  Secondly, on 
15 October 1987, the study then computes Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) 
for each stock over the sub-period as:
CAR ARi it
t 1
286
=
=
/
Where is the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for stock i over 286 days starting 
on 2 January 1987 and ending on 15 October 1987 (the formation period).  is the 
abnormal return for stock i of day t.  The study then rank all those stocks from high 
to low based on their CARs.  The top 10% is placed in the winner portfolio while 
the bottom 10% is in the loser portfolio.  On 31 Dec 1987, which is the last day 
of test period for pre-1987 crisis, the study once again calculates CARs for every 
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stock from the winner and the loser portfolio over the period of 70 days from 16 
October 1987 to 31 December 1987.
CAR ARi it
t 1
70
=
=
/
The study then investigates for evidence of overreaction by comparing the 
performance of the winner and loser portfolios during the test period.  To achieve 
this objective, the study uses parametric t-test for two independent samples.  The 
null and alternative hypotheses are as follows:
H0:  CARs CARsL W=
H1: CARs CARsL W2
The mean difference in the CARs of the loser and winner portfolios are 
estimated and tested using the t- test.  Positive and significant t-values imply that 
loser portfolio has outperformed winner portfolio during the test period.  The above 
procedures are repeated for the rest of the sub-periods.
FINDINGS
Economics Events
As presented in Table 3, the findings of the study reveal that investors overreact 
in times of crisis.  For 1987 crash, for both loser and winner that was formed pre, 
during and post crisis, the results were consistent with stock overreaction behaviour. 
Table 3 Differences in CARs in the test period: Economic events
Events Mean Loser Mean Winner Mean Loser-Winner t-stat
1987 Crash
Pre 2.7929 -9.5481 13.34098 1.886*
During 23.1065 -65.6626 88.76908 5.126***
Post 12.5528 -9.7782 22.33099 4.775***
Asian Financial Crisis
Pre -48.3196 -88.5798 40.2601 2.513***
During 25.8496 -37.8612 63.71082 8.239***
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.
Loser portfolio has been undervalued pre, during and post 1987 crash and 
reversed in the subsequent period after investors realized that they have overly 
undervalued those stocks.  In contrast, for winner portfolio, investors have been 
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overly optimistic about these stocks and push the prices above what they should 
have been.  Prices reverse in the subsequent period once investors realize of the 
overvaluation.  These results are therefore consistent with overreaction hypothesis, 
which states that extreme movement in stock prices will be followed by subsequent 
price movement in the opposite direction.  The results also show that loser has 
significantly outperformed winner at 10%, 1% and 1% for pre-, during and post 
1987 crash respectively.  These results are consistent with those reported by 
Michayluk and Neuhauser (2006).  In their study, they also found evidence that 
suggest investors overreact in time of crisis. 
Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3 clearly show the reversal behaviour for both 
loser and winner portfolio pre-, during and post 1987 Crash respectively.  The graphs 
exhibit that the formation period loser portfolio has reversed and becoming winner 
by earning positive abnormal returns in all sub-periods, namely pre-, during and 
post 1987 Crash.  On the other hand, the winner portfolio has also subsequently 
reversed in all the sub-periods mentioned above.  Furthermore, the graphs also 
show that loser has outperformed winner as presented by the positive abnormal 
returns earned by the arbitrage portfolio in all the three sub-periods.  Notice that 
Figure 1 CARs in the test period of pre-crash 1987
Figure 2 CARs in the test period of during crash 1987
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the reversal behaviour took place as early as one day after the formation period 
for each sub-period of pre-, during and post 1987 Crash, and 10 days after the 
formation period for during 1987 Crash.  These patterns are generally consistent 
with the overreaction hypothesis.  So, this study concludes that Malaysian stock 
market overreacts to 1987 Financial Market Crash.
Figure 3 CARs  in the test period of post crash 1987
As exhibited in Table 3, the study also reveals that portfolios formed during 
the Asian Crisis have significantly reversed their fortune in the subsequent period 
with loser outperformed winner at 1% significant level.  However, portfolios 
formed in pre crisis sub-period present mixed results with only the winner portfolio 
exhibit the reversal behaviour whereas the loser portfolio indicates continuation 
behaviour.  Notice that the test period for the pre-Asian Financial Crisis falls 
during the Asian Financial Crisis period and it is generally known that in a crisis 
period, it is more likely that the market will overreact to bad news (Otchere 
and Chan, 2003).  Therefore loser will likely to continue to become loser in the 
crisis period (test period for pre-crisis) and as a result, no reversal behaviour is 
observed for loser portfolio in Pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis.  Nevertheless, 
loser portfolio has significantly outperformed winner at 1% significant level and 
this result is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.  Findings of this study 
are also consistent with that of Otchere and Chan (2003) for Hong Kong Stock 
Market.  In conclusion, Malaysian stock market overreacts to 1997 Asian Financial 
Crisis and the overreaction is more pronounced for winner than for loser.  Such 
behaviour is not surprising since overreaction behaviour seems to be asymmetric 
in nature.  Figure 4 and Figure 5 further illustrates the overreaction behaviour in 
a graphical form.  Notice that arbitrage portfolio earned positive abnormal returns 
for both pre- and during 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, which indicates that loser 
has outperformed winner as predicted by the overreaction hypothesis.  It is worth 
to note that the overreaction effect is more pronounced in sub-period during the 
1997 Asian Financial Crisis than the pre-1997 Asian Financial Crisis sub-period. 
Figure 5 shows that both loser and winner portfolios formed during the crisis has 
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reverse even after one day of the test period.  Meanwhile, winner portfolio formed 
prior to the crisis only reversed in about 10 days after the formation period.  Loser 
portfolio on the other hand, shows continuation behaviour in the test period of 
pre- sub-period.  However, arbitrage portfolio of buying loser and selling winner 
earned positive abnormal returns, thus consistent with the overreaction hypothesis.
Figure 4 CARs of pre-1997 Asian financial crisis
Figure 5 CARs of during 1997 Asian financial crisis
Overall, this study suggests that Malaysian stock market overreacts to economic 
crisis.  The reason for the overreaction could be due to abnormal economic activity 
that taken place during the crisis period.  The stock market may not be fully efficient 
during the period.
Domestic Events
The findings of the study as summarised in Table 4 reveals that Bursa Malaysia 
overreacts to announcement of removal of the Deputy Prime Minister (DPM) and 
announcement of resignation of the Prime Minister (PM) at 1% significant level. 
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Contrarian strategy of selling winner and buying loser formed during removal 
of the DPM are able to generate abnormal return up to 20% while those formed 
during resignation of PM earns potential significant profit of 5%.  Evidence of 
stock overreaction behaviour to removal of the DPM and resignation of the PM is 
very much anticipated by the study.  It is because; both leaders namely Datuk Seri 
Anwar Ibrahim and Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohamad are known to be very good and 
knowledgeable economist.  Furthermore, both of them hold the position of Finance 
Minister during their services.  Therefore, removal of the former and resignation of 
the latter will have an impact on the Malaysian stock market which in turn might 
have an influence on investors’ overreaction behaviour in this market.
Table 4 Differences in CARs in the test period: Domestic events
Events Mean Loser Mean Winner Mean Loser-Winner t-stat
Removal of the DPM
During -7.8542 -28.7418 20.8876 2.869***
Post 0.2538 2.5214 -2.26762 -1.253
Resignation of the PM
During 5.863 0.597 5.266 3.796***
8th General Election
During 0.8391 0.1202 0.71884 0.17
Post 10.1119 23.7397 -13.6278 -2.008**
9th General Election
Pre -4.2435 -2.3441 -1.899 -1.292
During -7.2702 -1.1929 -6.07724 -2.008**
Post 
10th General Election
During -2.3219 7.77814 -10.10322 -3.458***
Post -57.8815 -27.1788 -30.70272 -3.004***
11th General Election
During -5.4742 -1.8039 -3.67031 -1.592
Post -76.3221 -35.4326 -40.88951 -2.815***
Notes: *, ** and *** denote significant at 10%, 5% and 1 % respectively
The results also presents no evidence of stock overreaction behaviour existed 
in the Bursa Malaysia in the period when general elections have taken place. 
Instead, evidence of stock underreaction behaviour is observed in all general 
elections.  The results show that winner has significantly outperformed loser in the 
subsequent period which is consistent with underreaction behaviour.  One possible 
explanation to the absence of stock overreaction behaviour to announcement of 
general elections is that the general elections have been well announced and well 
deliberated in mass media.  Therefore, investors have been well informed of the 
events.  As a result, stock market is not expected to show much overreaction 
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behaviour during the general election.  Moreover, results of Malaysian general 
election are highly predictable.  Since independence, the winning party is always 
the ruling government‘s party.  Therefore, there is no surprise in the outcome of the 
general election.  Unless there is a surprise in the general election outcome, then 
evidence of overreaction behaviour might be existed in the stock market.
International Events
Table 5 presents results of stock overreaction behaviour with respect to international 
events over the period of January 1987 through December 2006.  Out of five events, 
only one event namely SARS outbreak provides significant evidence of stock 
overreaction behaviour.  To our surprise, the study shows that both wars namely 
the Gulf crisis and war on Iraq do not have any impact on Malaysia stock market. 
Generally, both wars that occurred in oil producer countries will have an impact on 
oil prices.  Oil prices will increase and that will affect the economy of the world. 
Therefore, some reactions from the Malaysian stock market are expected to occur. 
However, surprisingly, this study found no evidence of investor overreaction 
behaviour towards these two events namely the Gulf Crisis and Invasion of Iraq 
in Bursa Malaysia.
The study also shows no significant evidence of stock overreaction hypothesis 
for pre-, during and posts 2004 Asian Tsunami.  Although the devastating event had 
Table 5 Differences in CARs in the test period: International events
Events Mean Loser Mean Winner Mean Loser-Winner t-stat
Gulf Crisis
During -3.7485 -4.9644 1.21593 0.428
Sept 11
Pre -12.3178 -3.5777 -8.74006 -2.23**
During -12.4616 -10.1715 -2.29006 -0.345
Post -28.8652 -12.6489 -16.2163 -2.408***
SARS outbreak
During -0.7259 -4.0491 3.32321 2.043**
Invasion of Iraq
During 9.7738 9.1748 0.59899 0.106
Post -0.2256 0.9964 -1.22195 -0.833
2004 Asian Tsunami
Pre 2.4457 1.4366 1.00916 0.848
During -31.5179 -38.4611 6.94321 0.897
Post 11.1970 7.7224 3.4742 0.421
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significant at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively
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greatly affected the economy of the affected area, it has not caused the Malaysian 
stock market to overreact.  One possible explanation is that the economy quickly 
recovers because Malaysia has strong growth preceding the casualty.  Furthermore, 
it does not greatly affect the economy of Malaysia as it did to Banda Acheh for 
example.  Consequently, this event, although devastating might not resulted in 
investor overreaction in Bursa Malaysia.
SUMMARY
This study find that Malaysian stock market has significantly overreacts to 
economic events.  Findings of the study have documented significant evidence 
of stock overreaction where loser has significantly outperformed winner in both 
periods.  These results suggest that investors overreact to abnormal economic 
activity.  During this period of time, a series of positive news about a stock might 
have boosted investors’ confidence and thus causing them to highly overvalue the 
securities.  Once they realized of the overvaluation, and take corrective action, 
stock prices reverse in the subsequent period.  The opposite is true for a series of 
negative news.
The study also finds that Bursa Malaysia overreacts to surprises in political 
news.  Unexpected events namely the removal of the DPM and resignation of PM 
have caused investors to overreact.  Well announced events like announcement of 
general election appear not to significantly caused investors overreaction behaviour 
in the stock market.
Unlike test for economic and domestic events that support stock overreaction 
behaviour in Bursa Malaysia, those of international events present mixed results. 
The study shows that Malaysian stock market has significantly overreact to SARS 
outbreak, while significantly underreact to September 11th terrorist attacks.  Although 
Gulf Crisis and Invasion of Iraq involve oil producing country, surprisingly, 
Malaysian stock market does not show any evidence of stock overreaction behaviour 
towards those events.
Overall, evidences of short term behaviour presented by this study propose that 
Bursa Malaysia is not consistent with the weak form of EMH in the short run.  The 
results show that investors are able to earn abnormal profit by selling past winners 
and buying past loser upon surprises in political news and economic crisis for 
example.  In addition to that, arbitrage strategy of buying past winner and selling 
past loser will give potential abnormal profit to investors upon announcement of 
general election.  Therefore, this study suggest that knowing past performance of 
stocks enabled investors to beat the market when there is a surprise in information. 
So, this study concludes that Malaysian stock market is not weakly efficient in the 
short run.
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